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The balance of payments can act as a constraint to the rate of growth of output, on 
setting a limit to the growth of the level of demand to which supply can adapt. In this 
paper, we examine this issue for the case of Spain, using time series data extending over 
one-and-a-half century, i.e., the period 1850-2000. Our results show that the foreign 
sector would have worked as a constraint to growth only during some periods of 
remarkably high growth in comparison with the Western European average, such as 
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1. Introduction 
The Spanish economy has experienced a steady process of growth since the beginning 
of industrialization at the start of the 19th century. However, though following a rather 
similar evolution to that of the rest of Western Europe, she underwent a relative 
retardation as compared to those countries. Specifically, the real GDP of Spain 
multiplied by 40 over the period 1850-2000, with an annual average rate of growth of 
2.4 percent; in per capita terms, GDP multiplied by 15 over the same period, and the 
average rate of growth was 1.7 percent per year. But, despite the intense catching-up 
that took place in the last fifty years, per capita GDP of Spain at the end of the 20th 
century was still around three quarters of Western Europe’s, roughly the same as one 
hundred years before (Prados de la Escosura, 2007). 
 
  The important modernizing role played by the foreign sector on the evolution of 
the whole economy, though limited by its small relative size, has been emphasized 
elsewhere (Prados de la Escosura, 1988). In fact, the Spanish economy would have 
experienced a higher growth over those periods characterized by a greater external 
openness (as in, e.g., the 1960s, or the years after 1986); and, likewise, she fell behind 
coinciding with periods of a greater isolation against the rest of the world (such as the 
years 1890-1913, or 1930-1950) (Prados de la Escosura, 2007). On the whole, the lower 
weight of foreign trade on GDP as compared to the “European norm” (Molinas and 
Prados de la Escosura, 1989) could explain the relative backwardness of the Spanish 
economy until the last third of the 20th century. 
 
  On the other hand, it has been also argued that the trade deficit had been a 
chronic problem of the Spanish economy, given the traditional weakness of exports, and 
the need for essential imports such as energy, raw materials, intermediate products, and 
equipment goods. This, in turn, would have been translated into a subordination of 
growth to the evolution of the trade balance; see, e.g., Segura and García-Viñuela 
(1978).  
 
  The recent availability of long time series for both GDP (Prados de la Escosura, 
2003) and the foreign sector (Tena, 2005, 2007) invites to a re-examination of the 
relationship between growth and foreign trade for the case of the Spanish economy. In 
particular, we will analyze whether or not the balance of payments would have meant an 2 
impediment to further GDP growth over the period 1850-2000. If the answer to this 
question was negative, then a greater exposure of the Spanish economy to international 
competition would have most probably led to a higher GDP growth and catching-up as 
regards the rest of Western Europe. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 offers a 
review of the literature on the relationship between international trade and economic 
growth, together with the available evidence for the Spanish case; the theoretical 
framework is discussed in section 3; the empirical results are presented in section 4; and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The relationship between international trade (or, more generally, external openness) and 
economic growth is a widely discussed topic in economics, but still a controversial one.  
 
According to the standard model of economic growth, a higher integration 
among countries, by removing the barriers to the mobility of goods and factors, would 
lead in the short run to an increased efficiency in the use of productive inputs. This in 
turn would translate into an increase in output from a given amount of inputs: these are 
the so-called static gains of integration. In the medium run, the increased level of 
production, by increasing savings and investment and then the capital stock, would lead 
to an additional increase in output. Finally, in the long run a permanent increase in the 
rate of growth might happen if the capital stock exhibits increasing returns to scale 
(directly in the production function, and by way of externalities); or, alternatively, if 
higher economic integration results in an increased rate of technological progress. 
 
The above ideas, associated with the literature on endogenous growth, will allow 
for a greater role of the countries’ external openness in the process of generation and 
transmission of technology, as compared to the traditional, Solow-type, growth models. 
Specifically, a stream of endogenous growth models try to formalize the process of 
technological innovation in a context of imperfect competition, developing ideas 
previously put forward by Schumpeter (1934). These new approaches emphasize that 
technological innovation appears in response to economic incentives, i.e., profit 
opportunities detected by firms; where the institutional, legal, and economic 
environments that determine the profitability of these investments also affect the pace 
and direction of technological change (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). 3 
 
As said above, the literature on endogenous growth gives an important role to 
the extent of external openness and economic integration across countries, in order to 
influence technological progress and productivity growth (Grossman and Helpman, 
1990). In principle, a process of economic integration would mean an increase in the 
size of the market, leading to greater research incentives, and so to a higher growth 
(Romer, 1990). Also, integration would ease the diffusion of knowledge across 
countries and avoid any possible redundancy of the research activity. However, for a 
country with a comparative disadvantage in research-intensive activities, integration 
might result in a higher specialization in unskilled labour-intensive activities, which 
could eventually mean lower growth, on deviating resources away from the R&D-
intensive activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Further, integration across 
relatively similar economies would lead to a higher growth rate in the long run, on 
allowing the exploitation at the world level of the increasing returns to scale existing in 
the R&D sector (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
 
All this, in turn, would be related to another less formalized approach, originated 
in the field of economic history, namely, the catch-up hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, technological differences would be the main source of the differences in 
productivity across countries (Gerschenkron, 1962). Therefore, a relatively backward 
country could, in principle, “catch up” those most technologically advanced countries 
and increase its productivity levels, through the imitation and learning of those 
countries’ techniques. This process, though, would only occur if the backward country 
possesses the so-called “social capability”, namely, the technical skills (assessed by the 
educational level of its population), as well as the political, commercial, industrial and 
financial institutions, which would allow it to realize its potential of technological 
catch-up as regards the advanced countries (Abramovitz, 1986). These arguments were 
formalized in an influential paper by Nelson and Phelps (1966), who assume that the 
rate of technological progress of a country depends upon both educational attainment, 
and the gap between the theoretical level of technology and the level of technology in 
practice. 
 
Finally, we will also briefly refer to a large body of empirical literature based on 
the idea that international trade and, in general, a more open commercial policy, means 4 
a major factor in order to explain economic growth. This line of research, indeed, has 
been given a renewed impulse with the development of endogenous growth theories, on 
giving it some more solid theoretical foundations. In particular, it has been emphasized 
that a more liberalized trade stance allows countries to enjoy a higher amount of 
intermediate inputs at a lower cost, and encourages technological progress; and all this 
would result in higher rates of growth. This literature, which is mostly concerned about 
the case of developing countries, is surveyed in Edwards (1992, 1993).  
 
However, the evidence in favour of this hypothesis is far from being 
unambiguous, as shown in an influential paper by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001). As 
these authors point out, the relationship between external openness and economic 
growth would be rather a contingent one, dependent on a host of particular 
characteristics, both country-specific and external; and, among them, the importance of 
institutions would be crucial. 
 
Turning to the case of Spain, and as noticed elsewhere, higher growth periods 
have been usually related in a long-term perspective, to increases in the degree of 
external openness (see, e.g., Carreras and Tafunell, 2003, Chapter 11). So, during the 
second half of the 19th century, the Spanish foreign trade grew faster than in France or 
Britain (Tortella, 2000). The situation began to change in the 1890s, when a more 
protectionist policy stance was implemented. Accordingly, the degree of openness, 
which had increased steadily since 1850 (although at still lower levels than the 
European average), began to decrease after 1895, which was intensified after the 
Spanish Civil War, and reached its minimum in the 1940s (Tena, 2005). In fact, the 
latter period, characterized by the pursuit of “autarchy” by the new government issued 
from the Civil War, represents, not only the minimum in the ratio of openness, but also 
the lowest point in the process of convergence of the Spanish economy towards Western 
Europe. In Gabriel Tortella’s words, “The Civil War and the first Franco period 
produced a radical regression within the Spanish economy, a kind of sudden jump 
backwards into self-sufficiency and primary production, a regression that did not begin 
to correct itself until the 1950s” (Tortella, 2000, p. 366). This trend was only reverted 
since the 1960s and, especially, after the Spanish integration into the now European 
Union (EU) in 1986, when the ratio of openness reached comparable figures to those of 
the rest of Western Europe. 5 
 
On the other hand, since the classical work of Sardà (1948), the traditional vision 
of the Spanish foreign sector has been that of a chronic deficit in the trade balance, 
which was even aggravated in higher growth periods. From here, some authors have 
argued that such a chronic trade deficit would have hindered the economic growth 
prospects of the Spanish economy; in other words, the trade deficit would have worked 
as a constraint to economic growth.  
 
The empirical evidence on this issue is not too abundant, though. Herranz-
Loncán and Tirado-Fabregat (1996) estimate export and import functions for the period 
1870-1913. Since, when looking at the estimated income elasticities for exports and 
imports, the former was found to be smaller than the latter, the authors conclude that the 
foreign sector would have meant a constraint to economic growth over the period.  
 
Following a related line of analysis, Serrano-Sanz (1997) computes the balance 
of payments-constrained growth rate proposed by Thirlwall (1979) (see the next 
section) for the periods 1870-1891, 1892-1935, 1940-1959, and 1960-1985. With the 
only exception of the first period, in the rest of cases the actual growth rate was above 
its balance of payments-constrained counterpart, concluding again that the foreign 
sector would have played a limitative role on growth after 1892. Notice that these 
results would imply that the foreign sector began to restrict growth just when more 
protectionist policies were implemented; see below.  
 
However, this same approach has been applied by Alonso (1999) to the more 
recent period 1960-1994. Since he finds a parallel evolution of both the actual and the 
balance of payments-constrained growth rates, the external constraint would have not 
been binding during that period. 
 
Finally, in a recent paper, Prados de la Escosura (2010) builds series for the 
current account balance over the years 1850-1913. The results from the new series 
reveal the existence of two broad periods in the evolution of the current account: one of 
persistent deficits between 1850 and 1890; and other where surpluses prevailed, 
between 1891 and 1913 (with the exception of the years 1899-1904). Since periods of 
higher (lower) growth went together with current account deficits (surpluses), the author 6 
concludes that the external constraint would have not worked during that period. 
According to Prados de la Escosura, economic growth at the end of the 19th century 
was encouraged by the high levels of foreign net capital inflows, which helped to 
finance current account deficits and complemented domestic savings. In turn, reversals 
of net capital inflows (in the form of “sudden stops”, i.e., significantly and 
unexpectedly) after 1891 slowed down growth since investment had to rely just on 
domestic savings.  
 
The central role of foreign capital inflows in the dissemination of ideas and 
innovations across borders has been often emphasized; e.g., Romer (1993). Regarding 
the Spanish case, foreign capital inflows played a central role in the evolution of the 
Spanish economy at the very beginning of industrialization (Nadal, 1975; Tortella, 
2000); and, later on, in the process of openness and high growth initiated after 1959 
(Muñoz, Roldán and Serrano, 1978b). Even more recently, foreign direct investment, 
acting as a channel of technology transfer and through its effects on enhancing 
productivity, seems to have been an important factor behind the outstanding rates of 
growth experienced by the Spanish economy after joining the EU (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-
Mora and Díaz-Roldán, 2010). 
 
In the rest of this paper, we will analyze the role of the external constraint on 
Spanish economic growth for the period 1850-2000, by estimating export and import 
elasticities, and computing the balance of payments-constrained growth rate. As can be 
seen from above, the (scarce) available evidence on the subject does not look too clear-
cut. Notice also that the results of some of the papers quoted before, concluding that the 
foreign sector would have restrained economic growth, are not free of problems, which 
could justify a further analysis of this issue. In particular, as noticed by Prados de la 
Escosura (2010), the estimates of the export and import elasticities in both Herranz-
Loncán and Tirado-Fabregat (1996) and Serrano-Sanz (1997) are rather dubious, since 
they use data on exports, imports, and prices that do not correct for the errors present in 
official trade figures; see Prados de la Escosura (2010, notes 5 and 6) for details. Also, 
Serrano-Sanz (1997) makes use of different estimation methods for the first, and for the 
rest of subperiods he considers. Unlike these previous studies, we will draw on a 
generally accepted dataset for a more extended time period, examine different 7 
alternative episodes within the whole period, and use a common estimation method for 
all subperiods. 
 
3. Theoretical framework  
The balance of payments can act as a constraint to the rate of growth of output, on 
setting a limit to the growth in the level of demand to which supply can adapt. So, an 
increase in domestic output, by increasing imports, can lead to a deficit in the balance of 
payments, which may require either a fall in demand or an exchange rate depreciation 
(i.e., a worsening of the terms of trade) in order to assure the sustainability of the 
foreign deficit. Accordingly, an unsustainable external deficit would require sooner or 
later a correction, which puts a brake on further output growth.  
 
A customary way of analyzing this issue follows Thirlwall’s approach to 
calculate the balance of payments-constrained growth rate, as the rate of growth of 
exports divided by the income elasticity of the demand for imports; see Thirlwall (1979) 
or Thirlwall and Hussain (1982). By comparing such a growth rate with that prevailing 
in a particular country, it would be possible to assess whether the balance of payments 
would have worked as a constraint to economic growth in the country analyzed. This 
approach, on the other hand, is equivalent to the well-known Krugman’s (1989) result, 
so that countries growing faster face a higher income elasticity for their exports than for 
their imports.  
 
Assume that the demands for exports and imports are described by the standard 
functions (see Goldstein and Khan, 1985): 
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where X and M stand for exports and imports volumes, and Y
* and Y for foreign and 
domestic real output, respectively; Q is the real exchange rate, measured as the price of 
domestic goods relative to foreign goods. To close the model, we add the equation for 




X B     8 
where B and F denote, respectively, the balance of payments and net capital inflows in 
real terms, in terms of domestic goods. 
 
In order to keep unchanged the balance of payments, it is required that: 
   0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ε ˆ ε ˆ ε ˆ ε , , , ,       







Q M Y M Q X Y X  
where   
Y X , ,  Y M,  ,  Q X ,  , and  Q M,   are the (absolute values of the) income and price 
elasticities of exports and imports, respectively; and the symbol ^ over a variable 
denotes its growth rate. Assuming that initially B = 0, so that 
Q
M
F X   , in order to 
have the balance of payments in equilibrium we must have: 
     0 ˆ φ ˆ 1 ε ε φ 1 ˆ ε ˆ ε φ 1 , , , ,        






φ  . 
 
Assume for a moment there are no capital inflows, so that φ = 0 and 
  0 ˆ 1 ε ε ˆ ε ˆ ε , , , ,     

 Q Y Y Q M Q X Y M Y X  
As can be seen from the above equation, a country growing relatively faster (i.e., when 
 Y Y ˆ ˆ ) should have, other things equal, a depreciating real exchange rate (provided 
that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds). However, as shown by Krugman (1989), in a 
context of imperfect competition those countries showing higher growth rates will 
increase their shares of world markets, not by reducing the relative prices of the goods 
they produce, but by raising instead the number of varieties. Accordingly, such 
countries will enjoy more favourable income elasticities (i.e., a higher   
Y X ,  and a lower 
Y M,  ) and would be able to experience relatively higher growth rates without the need 
of real exchange rate depreciation in the long run. 
 
Hence, if there is no long-run trend in the real exchange rate,  0 ˆ  Q , we would 











,  9 
i.e., a country growing relatively faster should have a relatively higher income elasticity 
for exports than for imports; this is Krugman’s (1989) “45-degree rule”. From here, we 
can get a related result, by finding the balance of payments-constrained growth rate,  B Y ˆ , 
i.e., the maximum growth rate a country can achieve while keeping in equilibrium the 











,         ( 1 )  
This rule, derived by Thirlwall (1979), is the dynamic analogue of the Harrod trade 
multiplier (Harrod, 1933), and implies that a country growing above  B Y ˆ  will run an 
external deficit, which would harm its future growth prospects; conversely, a country 
growing below  B Y ˆ  will run an external surplus.  
 
  Finally, if the real exchange rate were not constant over the long run, the balance 
of payments-constrained growth rate would be: 
 
Y M











      ( 2 )  
which, in the most general case where capital movements are allowed, becomes 
(Thirlwall and Hussain, 1982): 
    
Y M











     (3) 
 
In the next section, we will provide estimates of the balance of payments-
constrained growth rate for the Spanish case over the period 1850-2000, in its three 
versions (1), (2) and (3). 
 
4. Empirical results 
In order to apply the above theoretical framework, we rely on the foreign sector data of 
Tena (2007). The period of analysis is 1850-2000. Specifically, we use data on exports 
and imports, both in real terms (Table 3, series 9 and 10); real exchange rate, measured 
as the quotient of the price indices of exports and imports (Table 4, series 13); and 
(minus) the current account balance, as a proxy of capital inflows (Table 8, series 74). 
Notice, however, that the latter variable is available from a regular basis only after 
1940; for the years before, we have relied on the series of Prados de la Escosura (2010), 10 
only available from 1850 to 1913 (Appendix 1, column 12). The data on real GDP have 
been taken from Prados de la Escosura (2003). Finally, regarding foreign output, the 
series on real GDP of the EU built by Carreras and Tafunell (2004, 2005) has been 
used, as a proxy for the GDP of Western Europe. Notice that Western Europe was the 
main market for Spanish exports over the whole period, with a share on total exports 
always above 50 percent (Tena, 2007). 
 
First of all, we have estimated the exports and imports elasticities using the 
method of Phillips and Hansen (1990). This method tries to eliminate the potential 
biases that could appear when estimating under ordinary least squares, by computing a 
class of Wald tests, modified by semiparametric corrections for serial correlation and 
endogeneity bias. The values of the estimated elasticities for the whole period appear in 
the first row of Table 1. Notice that the figures in parentheses are the Phillips and 
Hansen’s fully-modified Wald test statistics, asymptotically distributed as a χ
2 with one 
degree of freedom; the critical values for these tests are 3.84 and 6.63 for the 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. In addition, the first row of Table 2 shows, 
respectively, the annual average growth rates of the GDP of Spain and the EU, and the 
balance of payments-constrained growth rate according to equations (1), (2) and (3). 
Notice, however, that we cannot compute version (3) due to the lack of data for our 
proxy on capital inflows for the whole period of analysis. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, over the whole period 1850-2000 the estimated 
income elasticities for both exports and imports are small, and rather similar, so that, 
according to Krugman’s argument, they should correspond to similar growth rates for 
the two economies, Spain and the EU. In turn, the real exchange rate elasticity was only 
significant (at the 5% level) for exports, but not for imports (and the coefficient is even 
estimated with the wrong sign). The above is indeed true since, as shown in Table 2, the 
annual average rate of growth of the Spanish GDP was only slightly above that of the 
EU for this 150-year period. Finally, the actual and balance of payments-constrained 
growth rates look also rather similar, even though somewhat higher for the former. 11 
Accordingly, the foreign sector would have hardly worked as a constraint to the growth 
of the Spanish economy over the long run. 
 
 
Table 1. Estimated exports and imports elasticities. Spain, 1850-2000 
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b denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
 
However, since the behaviour of the series might be quite different along such a 
long period, we have repeated the above exercise across a set of different subperiods.  
 
A first option would be looking at the evolution of the GDP series, and trying to 
detect any possible structural changes in economic growth. We will rely here on the 
three phases identified by Prados de la Escosura (2003), who performs unit root tests 
including several possible exogenous breaks, and selects those that maximize the t-12 
statistic of the coefficient on lagged GDP. His results show two structural changes in the 
trend of the GDP series dated at 1951 and 1975, together with a break in the level at 
1936. Accordingly, we have estimated exports and imports elasticities, and calculated 
the actual and balance of payments-constrained growth rates, for the three subperiods 
1850-1950, 1951-1974, and 1975-2000. The results appear in rows two, three and four 
of Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 2. Actual and balance of payments-constrained growth rates. 
Spain, 1850-2000 
 
  Y ˆ  
 Y ˆ   1 ˆ
B Y   2 ˆ
B Y   3 ˆ
B Y  
1850-2000 2.55 2.36 2.17 2.14  − 
1850-1950 1.41 1.82 1.48 1.32  − 
1951-1974 6.23 4.45 4.93 5.06 6.13 
1975-2000 3.02 2.25 3.82 3.79 3.78 
1850-1935  1.62 1.76 1.61 1.54  − 
1940-1959  3.00 2.73 1.45 1.48 1.70 
1960-2000  4.71 2.97 5.16 5.33 5.83 
1850-1891  1.47 1.83 1.56 1.65 0.91 
1892-1913  1.28 2.29 1.17 0.99 1.10 
1914-1935  2.03 1.21 0.86  −0.59  − 
1960-1974  7.49 4.23 6.14 4.67 4.48 
1986-2000  3.39 2.19 3.24 3.50 4.07 
 
 
Beginning with 1850-1950, the picture does not look too different as compared 
to the whole period. First, we found now very low, and even smaller than before, 
income elasticities, at the same time that the real exchange rate elasticities were not 
statistically significant. Overall, this would reflect the predominance of agricultural 
products in the Spanish foreign trade over that period. In addition, the rate of GDP 
growth would be somewhat below that of the EU; and, since the actual and balance of 
payments-constrained growth rates would be now quite similar, the foreign sector 
would not appear to have restricted GDP growth. As pointed out elsewhere (e.g., Tena, 
1995, 2007), the Spanish economy was a relatively closed one along those years. In 
particular, she was characterized by a protectionist stance reinforced in some particular 
events (such as the end of the 19th century, or the years immediately after the Spanish 13 
Civil War), and with a revealed comparative advantage in agricultural products, leading 
to an erratic and even unpredictable foreign trade. 
 
Things seem to change after the 1950s. The estimated income elasticities turn to 
be more favourable according to Krugman’s terminology, showing a remarkable 
increase and becoming higher for exports than for imports; the real exchange rate 
elasticity was only significant for exports. This relates in turn to an average annual rate 
of GDP growth significantly higher than of the EU (and despite the strong increase 
experienced by the latter). These results would follow after a process of increasing 
external openness and structural change, especially intense during the 1960s, where 
manufactures began to take the leading role within the structure of the Spanish foreign 
trade. However, the fact that the actual growth rate was well above the balance of 
payments-constrained one (although not so much when capital movements are taken 
into account), means that the foreign sector would have worked as a constraint to the 
growth of the Spanish economy along this period. This evidence is consistent with the 
appearance of situations of “stop-and-go” during that time: when the economy grew too 
fast the balance of payments deteriorated, putting pressure on the exchange rate so 
foreign reserves fell, and a period of slower growth followed in order to correct the 
external disequilibrium. Such a state of affairs would have been also related to the 
structural transformations of the 1960s, with an increase in the needs of imported 
intermediates due to a change in both the composition of exports and the whole 
productive structure (Fanjul and Segura, 1977). 
 
Finally, the last quarter of the 20th century has contemplated a new process of 
external openness of the Spanish economy, especially after joining the EU in 1986. The 
estimated income elasticities strongly increased, even more in the case of exports; and 
now the real exchange rate elasticity was only significant for imports. On the other 
hand, despite the deceleration in growth rates as compared to the previous period, the 
rate of GDP growth was still higher than the EU’s. In turn, the actual growth rate was 
slightly below its balance of payments-constrained counterpart in e a c h  o f  i t s  t h r e e  
versions, suggesting that the foreign sector would have not restrained GDP growth 
during those years. 
 14 
An alternative way of characterizing different subperiods would be looking at 
the evolution of the foreign trade series. Serrano-Sanz, Sabaté-Sort and Gadea-Rivas 
(2008) apply the Bai and Perron (1998) tests for the presence of multiple endogenous 
structural changes, to the Spanish foreign sector series over the period 1869-1999, 
finding a break at some point in the 1940s. Hence, they identify two stages in the 
evolution of the Spanish foreign sector: a first one before 1935, which they call of 
“unpredictable trade” (characterized by the predominance of primary products), and a 
second one after 1960, which they call of “mature trade” (characterized by the 
predominance of manufactures and services); with the 1940s and 1950s being a 
transition period. In this way, we have repeated our previous exercise for the three 
subperiods 1850-1935, 1940-1959, and 1960-2000; and the results are shown in rows 
five, six and seven of Tables 1 and 2
1. 
 
As can be seen in the tables, for the period 1850-1935 income elasticities are 
low, and the exchange rate elasticity of exports is wrongly signed; whereas the actual 
growth rate was roughly the same than the balance of payments-constrained one. Next, 
in 1940-1959, income elasticities are even smaller, the exchange rate elasticity of 
imports is now wrongly signed, and the actual growth rate was quite above the balance 
of payments-constrained one. Finally, in 1960-2000, income elasticities are quite higher 
(especially that of exports), the exchange rate elasticity of exports is not significantly 
different from zero, and the actual growth rate (quite above that of the EU) was slightly 
below its balance of payments-constrained counterpart. Accordingly, only during 1940-
1959, i.e., the “autarchy” period, the foreign sector would have proved to be a constraint 
to GDP growth. This result would match the abrupt end of the short-lived growth period 
of the 1950s, which led to a high inflation and an increasing external deficit. The latter, 
in turn, translated into the almost total depletion of foreign exchange reserves by mid-
1959, which forced General Franco’s regime to a complete reorientation of economic 
policies following the advice of the major international economic organizations (Sardà, 
1970). 
 
We have tested some more subperiods. First, within the period before the 
Spanish Civil War, 1850-1935 (the “unpredictable trade” period of Serrano-Sanz et al., 
                                                           
1   Notice that, in a paper aimed to find structural changes in the evolution of the Spanish GDP over 
the period 1870-1994, Pons-Novell and Tirado-Fabregat (2006) obtain three breaks at the same 
dates, i.e., 1935, 1940 and 1960. 15 
2008), two possible break points have been allowed for, i.e., in 1891 and 1913. The first 
one relates to the inward-looking stance adopted at the end of the 19th century (Muñoz, 
Roldán and Serrano, 1978a). This was characterized by a combination of protectionism 
of the domestic industry, the preservation of the domestic market to domestic 
production (helped by a strong government interventionism), and economic nationalism 
(in the sense of replacing foreign capital for domestic capital as the main driving force 
of growth). The changing point of this new policy stance can be dated at the approval of 
a new and extremely protectionist tariff in December 1891. On the other hand, the 
second one relates to the outbreak of World War I, which, by stopping the arrival of 
imports from the countries at war, and raising the demand for some Spanish exports, 
meant the consolidation of the previous policy strategy and led to a period of relatively 
high growth. In fact, the period 1914-1935 has been termed by Carreras and Tafunell 
(2003) as the “Silver Age” of the Spanish economy. The results for the three subperiods 
1850-1891, 1892-1913, and 1914-1935 appear in rows eight, nine and ten of Tables 1 
and 2. 
 
As shown in Table 1, income elasticities for the period 1850-1891 are much 
higher than for the other two subperiods, well above two. This would imply that the low 
values of these elasticities found previously for 1850-1950 or 1850-1935 are rather the 
result of the protectionist and nationalistic policies pursued after 1891. The exchange 
rate elasticities, in turn, were not significantly different from zero. As a consequence, 
and unless the other two subperiods, only in 1914-1935 (i.e., the highest-growth period) 
the actual growth rate was above the balance-of-payments constrained one, so the 
foreign sector would have constrained growth
2. 
 
Finally, we have also tried two possible break dates within the period 1960-2000 
(the “mature trade” period of Serrano-Sanz et al., 2008), i.e., 1974 and 1985. The results 
here should be taken with care, however, given the shortness of the subperiods 
analyzed: just 15 observations for 1960-1974 and 1986-2000; for this reason, we have 
not studied the (less interesting) subperiod 1975-1985, including just 11 observations. In 
particular, the years 1960-1974 (the “Golden Age” of the Spanish economy, as termed 
by Carreras and Tafunell, 2003) did contemplate the highest growth rates in modern 
                                                           
2   Notice that the calculated value of the balance-of-payments constrained growth rate including 
the exchange rate elasticities was negative in this case, due to the very small income elasticities 
coupled with also very small exchange rate elasticities (not significantly different from zero). 16 
Spain. The increased openness of the economy, following the Stabilization Plan of 1959 
that ended the autarchic trends dominating since the end of the Spanish Civil War, has 
been deemed as being at the root of these developments (e.g., Donges, 1971, 1976). The 
early 1970s meant the end of the expansionary phase experienced by the Western 
economies after World War II, so, after some years of economic stagnation (that 
coincided with the years of transition to a democratic regime), growth soared again after 
1986, the year in which Spain joined the EU. The nature and effects of trade 
liberalization policies during those years have been analysed in De la Dehesa, Ruiz and 
Torres (1991) for the 1960s and early 1970s; and in Bajo-Rubio and Torres (1992) for 
the period following Spain’s entry into the EU. The results for the subperiods 1960-
1974 and 1986-2000 are shown in the last two rows of Tables 1 and 2. 
 
  Looking at Table 1, we can see that income elasticities show greater values than 
in previous periods, always higher for exports, and roughly twice in 1986-2000 as 
compared to 1960-1974; exchange rate elasticities, however, were not significantly 
different from zero, except for imports in 1960-1974. Accordingly, the actual growth 
rate was higher than the balance-of-payments constrained one, and the foreign sector 
would have restrained growth, in 1960-1974, but not in 1986-2000. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Spanish economy has experienced a steady process of growth through the period 
1850-2000, following a similar evolution to that of the rest of Western Europe. 
However, only in the second half of the 20th century Spain could catch-up with these 
countries, offsetting, at least partially, her relative retardation dating back to the start of 
industrialization. Although the periods of higher growth have been related to increases 
in the degree of external openness, some concerns have been also raised about whether 
a more open foreign sector could become a constraint to further growth via 
unsustainable trade deficits. This argument would be justified given the structural 
problems underwent by the Spanish economy, as shown in the weakness of exports, and 
the need for some essential imports. 
  
In this paper, we have analyzed whether or not the balance of payments would 
have meant an impediment to further GDP growth vis-à-vis Western Europe, over the 
period 1850-2000. To this end, we have followed a simple approach, calculating the so-17 
called balance of payments-constrained growth rate from estimated income and real 
exchange rate elasticities for exports and imports, also taking into account the role of 
capital inflows. Then, this balance of payments-constrained growth rate is compared 
with the actual GDP growth rate. For the whole period 1850-2000, the Spanish rate of 
GDP growth was only slightly above both the EU’s growth rate, and the balance of 
payments-constrained growth rate, so that the foreign sector would have hardly worked 
as a constraint to the growth of the Spanish economy over the long run.  
 
Next, since the behaviour of the series might be quite different during such a 
long period, we have repeated the main exercise across a set of different subperiods. 
Several alternative periods have been examined. First, the three phases identified by 
Prados de la Escosura (2003), by looking at the evolution of the GDP series, i.e., 1850-
1950, 1951-1974, and 1975-2000. Second, the periods 1850-1935, 1940-1959, and 
1960-2000, identified by Serrano-Sanz, Sabaté-Sort and Gadea-Rivas (2008) according 
to the evolution of the foreign trade series. Finally, some additional subperiods were 
also examined within the latter ones, according to some particular events, i.e., the 
adoption of an inward-looking policy stance in 1891, the outbreak of World War I in 
1914, the end of the expansionary phase experienced by the Western economies after 
World War II in 1974, and the Spanish integration into the EU in 1986. As a general 
conclusion, we can state that the foreign sector would have worked as a constraint to 
growth only during some periods of remarkably high growth in comparison with the 
Western European average, namely, 1914-1935, and, especially, the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
The above results would point to some degree of continuity, for the conclusions 
of the paper, before and after the implementation of the Stabilization Plan in 1959, since 
the external constraint to growth would have operated both before and after that year
3. 
On the other hand, the income elasticities for exports and imports seem to have reached 
some more favourable values, according to Krugman’s (1989) terminology, since the 
1960s and, especially, the mid-1970s. In other words, the increased external openness, 
coupled with the structural transformations operated in the Spanish foreign trade over 
the last thirty years, seem to have faded out the role of the external constraint to growth. 
                                                           
3   In a recent paper, Prados de la Escosura, Rosés and Sanz-Villarroya (2010) stress this continuity 
between the policy stance in the 1950s and 1960s, so that the gradual liberalization operated 
during the 1950s would appear as a prerequisite for the implementation of the Stabilization Plan 
in 1959. 
 18 
In addition, once Spain joined the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU after 1999, 
the disappearance of the exchange rate risk made easier to borrow in international 
markets, due to both an increase in the supply of funds available and a decrease in its 
cost. In other words, the allowable external deficit would be higher in a monetary union 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). Although this argument should not mean neglecting 
the size of the external deficit, it certainly softens the practical significance of the 
external constraint to growth for a country belonging to a monetary union. 
 
Overall, the evidence in this paper would suggest than an increased external 
openness had proved to be a relevant factor in the growth of the Spanish economy, since 
growth rates were higher in those periods of greater foreign trade liberalization. The 
potential restrictive role on growth of an increased external openness, through a 
potentially unsustainable trade deficit, would have showed only in periods of 
remarkably high growth rates in comparison with the Western European average, such 
as 1914-1935, and, especially, 1950-1975. In addition, such a restriction seems to be no 
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